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SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST OR
STATISTICAL SPIN-DOCTOR?:
BJoRN LOMBORG AND THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS
Robert V. Percivalt
INTRODUCTION

The Skeptical Environmentalistby Bj0rn Lomborg, an associate professor of statistics at the University of Aarhus in Denmark,
has sparked unusually intense reactions from both its critics and its
champions. The tone of these reactions has become almost hysterical at times. Supporters of Lomborg's work acclaim it as the
most significant work of environmental literature since Silent
Spring' and they argue that it should lead to fundamental changes
in environmental policy. Critics are vehement in denouncing
Lomborg's work. The Scientific American attacked it in an 11page editorial entitled "Science Defends Itself Against the Skeptical Environmentalist '2 and at a book signing, a scientist researching global climate change hit Lomborg in the face with a Baked
Alaska.3
Both reactions seem a bit extreme, for Lomborg's basic theme
is nothing new. It received a flurry of public attention in 1995
when it appeared in Gregg Easterbrook's book A Moment on the

1 Professor of Law, Robert Stanton Scholar and Director, Environmental Law Program,
University of Maryland School of Law. Professor Percival would like to thank Dan Fruchter
(Maryland Class of 2004) for research assistance with this article.
I See Dennis Dutton, Greener Than You Think: The Skeptical Environmentalist, WASH.
POST, Oct. 21, 2001, Book World, at 1.
2 David Wojick, The Shame of Scientific American, DARTMOUTH REV., Jan. 21, 2002,
available at http://www.dartreview.com/archives/000417.php.
I Anti-Lomborg Website, Pies for Damn Lies and Statistics as Danish Anti-Green Author
Gets his Just Desserts, at http://www.anti-lomborg.com/pressl .htm (Sept. 5, 2001) (explaining
that the pie thrower, Mark Lynas, specifically chose Baked Alaska to show solidarity with the
native people of Alaska, who are among the most affected by climate change).
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Earth.4 Like Easterbrook, Lomborg claims that global environmental conditions are rapidly improving. Based on his analysis of
statistical data, Lomborg writes:
We will not lose our forests; we will not run out of energy,
raw materials or water. We have reduced atmospheric pollution in the cities of the developed world and have good reason to believe that this will also be achieved in the developing world. Our oceans have not been defiled, our rivers have
become cleaner and support more life .... Nor is waste a particularly big problem....
...The problem of the ozone layer has been more or less
solved. The current outlook on the development of global
warming does not indicate a catastrophe.... And finally, our
chemical worries and fear of pesticides are misplaced and
counterproductive. 5
Lomborg's conclusions are remarkably similar to those of
Easterbrook, who, writing three years before the European edition
of The Skeptical Environmentalistfirst appeared, predicted
*
*

*

[t]hat in the Western world pollution will end within
our lifetimes, with society almost painlessly adapting
a zero-emissions philosophy.
That several categories of pollution have already
ended.

That most feared environmental catastrophes, such as
runaway global warming, are almost certain to be
avoided.6

Surprisingly, Lomborg never cites Eastbrook's work, nor does
it appear in Lomborg's extensive bibliography. Despite the striking similarity of their claims, that environmental conditions are
improving more than most environmentalists acknowledge,
Easterbrook's work is more nuanced than Lomborg's work. While
making the same optimistic claims Lomborg does, Easterbrook
recognizes that not all environmental trends are moving in a posi4 GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH: THE COMING AGE OF ENVIRON-

MENTAL OPTIMISM (1995).
5 BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE

OF THE WORLD 329 (Cambridge University Press 2001) (1998).
6 EASTERBROOK, supra note 4, at xvi.
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tive direction, 7 and he gives more credit to environmental regulation as a source of environmental progress. While both decry
doom and gloom forecasts by environmentalists, Lomborg puts a
different "spin" on his argument. Lomborg claims that fear mongering by environmentalists has led society to put too much emphasis on environmental protection, and he suggests that resources
should be shifted to other priorities. It is here that Lomborg's argument falls apart. The sections that follow analyze Lomborg's
"spin" and why his review of environmental trends does
not support most of his policy conclusions.
I.

LOMBORG'S UNFAIR STEREOTYPE OF ENVIRONMENTALISTS

Even though Lomborg's argument is nothing new, it has outraged environmentalists, probably because of his charge that they
have been deliberately distorting the true state of the planet in order to scare people into supporting their causes. Easterbrook also
upset many in the environmental community, but unlike Lomborg,
he gives the environmental community credit for environmental
progress. Easterbrook writes:
Ecological consciousness is a leading force for good in world
affairs. Without the imperatives of modern environmentalism, without its three decades of unstinting pressure on government and industry, the Western world today might actually be in the kind of ecological difficulty conventional wisdom assumes it to be in. Instead, the Western world today is
on the verge of the greatest ecological renewal that humankind has known; perhaps the greatest that the Earth has know.
Environmentalists deserve credit for this remarkable turn of
events.8
Lomborg portrays the environmental movement as a kind of
monolithic entity whose preferred currency is fear-mongering to
scare the media and the public to believe "that doomsday is nigh." 9
He dubs this "the Litany" and concludes that virtually everything
environmentalists say is wrong.' 0 Lombard impugns the motives
7

For example, Easterbrook notes that overfishing has decimated many wild fish stocks.

Id. at 645. While Lomborg acknowledges that overfishing occurs, he seems unconcerned with
the decline of wild fish stocks because fish farms can replace the food they produce. LOMBORG,
supra note 5, at 106-08. In similar fashion, Lomborg does not appear concerned about the destruction of old growth forests because tree plantations can replace them. Id. at 115. Aesthetic
concerns generally get short shrift in Lomborg's analysis.
8 EASTERBROOK, supra note 4, at xvi.
9 LOMBORG, supra note 5, at 327.
10 While this might be considered an overstatement, Lomborg entitled a New York Times
op-ed he wrote on the eve of the recent World Summit on Sustainable Development simply: The
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of environmental scientists and employees of nonprofit environmental groups by suggesting that they seek to promote gloom and
doom in order to receive larger research grants and greater financial support." The notion that altruism, or anything other than a
desire to make money, could motivate expressions of concern for
the environment seems foreign to Lomborg.
As a result, Lomborg begins with a grossly unfair strawman
constructed to discredit environmental advocates. Lomborg fails
to understand that environmentalists are an incredibly diverse
group, with highly divergent views concerning priorities, policies,
12
and strategies, as I have explained in detail elsewhere, drawing
on my own experience working for an environmental organization.
The group I worked for, then called the Environmental Defense
Fund,1 3 was founded and run by scientists who generally avoided
doom and gloom prophesies and who often disagreed with the positions of other environmental groups. Lomborg not only fails to
appreciate this diversity, but he also is prone to indulge in gross
mischaracterizations of the views of others in an effort to demonize environmental advocates.1 4 He focuses largely on statements,
often made long ago (like those made 34 years ago in Paul Ehrlich's The PopulationBomb), by a few individuals (such as Lester
views or
Brown) that are not a fair representation of the range of
groups. 5
current priorities of mainstream environmental
Lomborg's lack of balance is illustrated by his failure to give
equal emphasis to the doom and gloom forecasts made by opponents of environmental regulation. He concentrates only on debunking forecasts of environmental harm, and not the dire scenarios prophesied for the economy by companies seeking to forestall
environmental regulation.' 6 Lomborg claims that the public is
EnvironmentalistsAre Wrong. Bjom Lomborg, The Environmentalists Are Wrong, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2002, at A15.
LOMBORG, supra note 5, at 37-39, 331, 360 n.274.
12 Robert V. Percival, Environmental Legislation and the Problem of Collective Action, 9
I

DUKE ENVT'L L. & POL'Y F. 9,16-18 (1998).
13 The Environmental Defense Fund is now called Environmental Defense.
14 A prime example is Lomborg's charge that former Vice President Al Gore categorizes
"anyone not entirely convinced of the supremacy of the environmental question with Nazism."
LOMBORG, supra note 5, at 359 n.248 (discussing AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE 272
(1992)).
I5 See, e.g., the articles listed in the most recent newsletter sent by Environmental Defense
to its members, ENVTL DEFENSE (Envtl Defense, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 2002, at 1 ("Historic
global warming law passed," "NC leads fight for clean air," "Preserving a vanishing forest,"
"Empty nets lead to fishing ban," "Putting chemicals on trial," "Better ways of getting there,"
"Removing targets for terrorism," "Alliance conquers dam.").
16 By contrast, Easterbrook is equally critical of what he calls right-wing "unviros" for
their unthinking opposition to environmental regulation. EASTERBROOK, supra note 4, at 16566, 230, 373-74, 461-63. Easterbrook acknowledges that nearly all environmental regulations
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skeptical of industry claims, but that they fail to understand the
ulterior motives of environmentalists. 7 Extrapolating from the
writings of a few individuals in an effort to undermine the credibility and motives of all environmental advocates, Lomborg presents
a highly distorted view of the environmental movement that focuses only on the side of doom and gloom forecasts.' 8
II.

LOMBORG'S POLICY "SPIN": DEVOTE LESS EFFORT TO
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Most critiques of Lomborg's work by scientists have focused
on disputing his statistics. Many reviewers argue that he has been
selective in his use of data in order to paint the most optimistic
possible picture of the state of the environment. While both Lomborg and Easterbrook have had to acknowledge factual errors in
their work,' 9 this is hardly surprising given the breadth of their
topics and the enormous uncertainties that surround data on the
state of the environment. But even if Lomborg's optimistic assessments of environmental trends were correct, they entirely fail
to support his basic policy conclusions that environmentalists have
caused us to waste resources, and that we should devote less effort
to environmental protection in the future. These conclusions simply do not follow logically from Lomborg's data on environmental
trends.
While Lomborg notes that environmental progress seems to
coincide with increasing levels of national income, he makes no
systematic effort to explore the underlying causes of environmental progress. Why is it that rising national incomes correlate
with improvements in environmental conditions? Is it because the
public increasingly demands government action to protect the environment? Lomborg's work provides scant basis for making any
judgments concerning how to improve environmental policy. Yet
this does not deter him from suggesting that we should relax existing environmental protection efforts.

have cost less than expected, usually far less than industry estimates. Id. at 187-88, 207-10,
318-19.
17 LOMBORG, supra note 5, at 38-39.
1S In this respect Lomborg's work is reminiscent of previous efforts to use an "environmentalist stereotype," a strategy first identified in Zach Willey, Progress & Privilege: America
in the Age of Environmentalism, II ECOLOLGY L. Q. 95 (1983).
19 See Bjorn Lomborg, Errors and Corrections, at http://www.lomborg.com/errors.htm

(Oct. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Errors and Corrections].
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Responding to this criticism, Lomborg maintains that "I con20
stantly point out that environmental protection is necessary,, citing the following statement in the introduction to his book:
However, pointing out that our most publicized fears are incorrect does not mean that we should make no effort toward
improving the environment. Far from it. It will often make
good sense to make some effort toward managing our resources and tackling our problems in areas like forest and
water management, air pollution, and global warming. The
point here is to give us the best evidence to allow us to make
the most informed decisions as to where we need to place
most of our efforts ...What this information should tell us is
not to abandon action entirely, but to focus our attention on
the most important problems and only to the extent warranted
by the facts. '
But while Lomborg says he is not advocating complete elimination of all environmental protection efforts (e.g., he is not advocating that we "abandon action entirely"22 or "make no effort towards improving the environment" 23), he clearly implies that we
are devoting too much effort to environmental protection and that
we need to refocus existing efforts. He states that:
The constant repetition of the Litany and the often heard environmental exaggerations has serious consequences. It
makes us scared and it makes us more likely to spend our rephantom problems while ignorsources and attention solving
....
24
ing real and pressing (possible non-environmental) issues.
Where has this environmentalist-induced fear caused us to
spend too many resources? Lomborg cannot say. He is unable to
make a persuasive case that public policy has suffered because of
too much public support for environmental causes.
One of the few examples Lomborg offers to support the notion that the public overreacts to environmental concerns is acid
rain. Lomborg claims that acid rain's "effect on forests was extremely slight or even non-existent,' 25 but that public concern
about it led to regulations requiring reductions in SO 2 emissions.
20 Bjorn Lomborg, unpublished letter to Science magazine responding to Michael Grubb
review, at http://www.lomborg.com (critiques and replies, Science 12-11-01, short reply letter)
(Oct. 13, 2002).
21 LOMBORG, supra note 5, at 5.
22 Id. (emphasis added).
23 Id. (emphasis added).
24
2

Id.
Id. at 172.
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But Lomborg has to concede that this supposed overreaction did
not harm society because the particulate emissions reduced by controls on S02 were enormously beneficial. 26 He estimates that reductions in particulates save "some 135,000 lives each year in the
US and some 64,000 lives in the UK ....',2 Nevertheless, Loiborg observes that it is "important to emphasize that just because
sulfur reduc.tion was a good idea (because it happened also to reduce concentrations of airborne particles, which are dangerous) it
is possible that particle reduction could have been achieved at a far
lower cost had the effort been focused at achieving just that. 28
Thus, his claim boils down to the notion not that our policy was
flawed, but rather that it could have been even better had we had
the benefit of perfect hindsight. But even this is a stretch given
that the mandated SO 2 reductions since 1990 have been achieved
through an innovative program that permits trading of emissions
allowances which has helped ensure that the reductions were made
at far less cost than anyone had anticipated.2 9
Responding to the observation that public concern has played
a major role in developing effective environmental regulations,
Lomborg states that "to the extent that worries have mattered in
policy decisions, as they undoubtedly have during the past 30
years in, say, air pollution, this does not assure us that our resources could not have been put to better use., 30 He then drops the
following footnote:
Although of course I would like to document the
(in)efficiency of past decisions, such evaluations are rarely
ever available. Apparently, making a cost-benefit analysis
of a decision already made and effected 3would be somewhat
pointless as it could make no difference. 1
Thus, Lomborg concedes that he lacks evidence to elucidate
where we have spent too much on environmental protection and
which regulations should be relaxed or abandoned. Instead of trying to identify specific areas where we are making too much effort,
Lomborg's argument is that democracy is suffering because some

26
27
28

Id. at 169, 172.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 388-89 n. 1206.

29 See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND

POLICY 595-96 (3d ed. 2000) (describing the beneficial effects of the emission allowance trading program).
-0 LOMBORG, supra note 5,at 32.
31 Id. at 359 n.250.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 53:263

environmentalists have made exaggerated claims. The only policy
guidance Lomborg can offer is the following:
I wish to leave to the individual reader the political judgment as to where we should focus our efforts. Instead, it is
my intention to provide the best possible information about
how things have progressed and are likely to develop in the
future, so that the democratic process is assured the soundest
basis for decisions.3 2
...

But rather than simply providing "the best possible information" to inform individual political judgments, Lomborg presents
his data with a pernicious spin that seeks to transform environmental progress into some kind of indictment of the environmental
movement. While this does not logically follow, as discussed below, Lomborg's argument is founded on his highly selective efforts to debunk cries of doom. As noted above, Lomborg ignores
the fact that opponents of environmental regulation have made
highly exaggerated claims of the dire consequences that would befall our economy if environmental protection measures were
adopted. 33 He is concerned only with the possibility that environmental advocates may cause society to overregulate, and not that
cries of woe by industry may cause underregulation. Given this
spin, Lomborg's advice about where to focus our efforts appears to
be anywhere but where the environmentalists want them, since his
principal theme is that environmentalists are virtually always
wrong.
III. HAS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW BEEN SUPERFLUOUS TO
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS?

Lomborg tries to ignore the fact that much of the environmental progress he trumpets is the product of existing environmental protection policies. Tremendous growth in public concern
for the environment during the late 1960s and early 1970s helped
spawn the establishment of comprehensive, national regulatory
programs to protect it. 34 These programs have been remarkably
successful. Thus, it should not be surprising to discover that environmental conditions are improving, as Lomborg argues they are.
But if the state of the environment is improving because environmental policies are working, this progress provides no basis for

32 Id. at 6.
33 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
.4

See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 29, at 104-09.
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Lomborg's claim that environmental protection efforts should be
relaxed. As one reviewer has noted:
The ultimate irony is that Lomborg could have presented his
mass of data as a tribute to the effectiveness of environmental
policy. That he chooses to do the opposite says far more
about him35 than about any claimed objectivity of his statistical
analysis.
Responding to this criticism on his website, 36 Lomborg suggests that environmental regulations have been largely superfluous
to environmental progress. Here he is venturing far from his area
of expertise, and he can offer only weak support for this farfetched claim. Lomborg states: "Specialist literature has contained
a lot of discussion about the degree to which legislation has been
crucial, or at least important, to the reduction of air pollution.
- not been able to
Many studies have - perhaps surprisingly
37
document any noteworthy effect.,
What evidence does Lomborg have that environmental law
has been largely superfluous to environmental progress? The following is the entire discussion of this issue that appears in Lomborg's book:
Analysis of the British Clean Air Act of 1956 [by Auliciems
Burton] shows that while pollution has, of course, fallen, the
difference between the rate of fall before and after 1956, or
the difference between cities that did or did not have pollution plans, is not discernible. 'It seems likely that in the absence of the Clean Air Act of 1956 substantial improvements
in air quality would have occurred anyway.' The explanation is to a high degree to be found in improved products and
technology for industry and the home.
In a study of three U.S. cities [by Powell], it was found
that the mandated pollution control had an effect, but that the
effects of regulatory control 'generally have been overshadowed by the effects of economic changes, weather, and other
factors.' Generally it is probably fair to say that regulation
is one of the reasons for the reduction of pollution but that
other, technological factors also play a major role.38
.5 Michael Grubb, Relying on Manna from Heaven?, 294 SCIENCE 1285, 1286 (2001)
(book review).
36 See Errors and Corrections,supra note 19.
17 LOMBORG, supra note 5,at 170.
3 Id. at 170.
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While he at least acknowledges that regulation has been a factor contributing to progress in reducing pollution, his effort to defend the incredible notion that environmental law has' not played a
very significant role is pitifully weak, as becomes apparent when
one examines the studies Lomborg cites to support his claim. The
Auliciems and Burton study on which Lomborg relies was conducted by two geography professors in 1972, when environmental
regulation was just getting off the ground. It examined smoke levels in the London region before and after the Clean Air Act of
1956 required localities to develop smoke control plans. In contrast to today's comprehensive national regulatory legislation, this
was a rather primitive pollution control measure.
The study noted that data on smoke emissions were quite unreliable because "the majority of the smoke recording stations have
themselves been established only since 1956." 39 Thus, it looked
only at smoke concentrations in Kew, a suburb of London, where
monitoring data was available dating back to the 1920s. While the
data showed large year-to-year variations in smoke levels, a least
square analysis fit a line with a declining slope from 1922 to 1971.
The authors concluded that "[i]t would, in our view, be as inappropriate to deny the value of the Clean Air Act on the basis of [this
data] as it is to assert its success on the basis of [post-1956
data]., 40 They explained that:
The processes involved are complex and interactive. Emissions of smoke may have been reduced in response to the application of the Clean Air Act or in anticipation of its application. Emissions have also declined as a result of industrial
and commercial change-over to oil in place of coal as a
source of heat and energy. On railways, diesel and electricity-powered engines have replaced steam. Residential users
have converted from the coal fire to electric and gas fires,
and to oil and central heating. The changes have been influenced in particular places and at certain times by urban renewal and slum clearance, by the availability and price
of
4
coal, and by other factors, including the Clean Air Act. 1
The authors then looked at three towns outside of London that
had not adopted smoke control plans and found that smoke levels
had declined there during the 1960s. Thus, they concluded that:

19 Andris Auliciems & Ian Burton, Trends in Smoke Concentration Before and After the
Clean Air Act of 1956, 7 ATMOSPHERIC ENV'T 1063 (1973).
40 Id.at1066.
41 Id.
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It seems likely that in the absence of the Clean Air Act of
1956 substantial improvements in air quality would have occurred anyway as a result of socio-economic factors that
have been leading to increased use of oil and fuels other than
coal in industry, and a displacement of the coal fire as the
normal form of domestic heating.4 2
The authors acknowledge that "the Clean Air Act of 1956 may
have hastened this process somewhat and has provided a tool for
prevention of detrimental smoke concentration in areas of future
development," but they think that the Act's actual effects may
have been exaggerated by its proponents. 43 This certainly is not a
"smoking gun" disproving the effectiveness of environmental law,
as the authors themselves explicitly acknowledged. All it reports
is that an early effort to get English towns to develop smoke control plans occurred at a time when smoke levels already were declining due to a shift away from coal use for home heating. From
this, we are to conclude that the vast body of environmental law,
most of which was enacted after the period covered by the study, is
largely superfluous to environmental progress? Are we to believe
that subsequent comprehensive pollution control regulations have
been unnecessary because industries voluntarily would have
stopped polluting anyway?
What about the "literature discussed in Powell 1997" and
Powell's "Three-City Air Study," the only other references Lomborg cites to support his claim? Here Lomborg is referring to a 16page, non peer-reviewed discussion paper by Mark R. Powell, a
fellow for the Center for Risk Management at Resources for the
Future, that apparently was never published."a The literature Powell discusses consists of two econometric studies by MacAvoy and
Broder 45 that examined the association between levels of pollution
control investments and levels of total suspended particulates.
Here is what Powell says about them. First, while the Broder
study initially found no correlation between pollution control investment and air quality between 1973 and 1977, "when the analysis was restricted to the eastern U.S., increased pollution control

Id. at 1069.
Id.
Mark R. Powell, Three-City Air Study, Discussion Paper 97-29, Resources for the
Future, at http:// www.rff.org/CFDOCS/disc-papers/PDFfiles/9729.pdf (March 1997).
45 Paul W. MacAvoy, The Record of the Environmental Protection Agency in Controlling
IndustrialAir Pollution, in ENERGY MARKETS AND REGULATION 107 (Richard C. Gordon etal.
eds., 1987); Iuy E. Broder, Ambient ParticulateLevels and Capital Expenditures:An Empirical
42

43
44

Analysis, 1996 AM. STAT. Ass'N PRoc., Bus. & ECON. STAT. SEC. 288.
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investments were associated with decreased TSP levels. 4 6 MacAvoy's study "concluded that pollution control investment plays a
limited role in explaining pollutant emissions by industry, and that
economic variables like coal usage, total investment, and product
price have much greater explanatory power., 47 Powell noted "important limitations to these two studies." He writes:
Broder's study covers many geographic areas, but it is based
on a limited period of time early in the development of national air pollution controls. While this early period may
have offered some "low hanging fruit" in terms of air pollution control efforts, it may not reflect the later benefits of institutional learning regarding the implementation of national
ambient air quality standards.
MacAvoy's study suffers from the same limitation of all efforts to evaluate the determinants of air pollution emissions.
Unlike ambient concentration, reported emissions are not actually measured. Instead, they are based on engineering estimates (i.e., formulae) ...If the engineering estimates assume that pollution controls have a limited effect on emissions, then analyzing reported emissions data can lead to no
other conclusion.48
Powell also notes a more recent study by Henderson 49 of data
from 1977-87 that found:
that a 1% increase in annual state pollution abatement expenditures leads to about a .04% improvement in local ambient
ozone readings and that increased local efforts to control
ozone have resulted in spreading out economic activity geographically (moving into areas classified as in attainment
with the NAAQS) and through time (stretching activity over
the day to dampen peaks in ozone inducing activity).5 °
Thus, none of these studies even tried to examine the impact
of environmental law or regulation on pollution levels. They all
sought to correlate spending on pollution control with reductions
in pollution and, despite major data limitations, they all found at
least a weak relationship between the two.
46 Powell, supra note 44, at 1.
47

Id.

48 Id. at 1-2.
49 J. VERNON HENDERSON, EFFECTS OF AIR QUALITY REGULATION (Nat'l Bureau of

Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5118, 1995).
50 Powell, supra note 44, at 2.
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Powell's own unpublished study looked at levels of particulates and ozone in three metropolitan counties in the U.S. from
1972-1992. He looked only at the high-end tail of the annual distribution of air quality data, which he conceded "is not indicative
of typical ambient air quality levels.",51 Thus, he cautioned that his
study "should not be misinterpreted as explaining changes in more
typical values (e.g., the median) of ambient air pollution concentrations. 52 Powell also had severe data quality problems that
force4q much of his data to be dropped and he questioned whether
"air quality data before the mid-1970s, or in some cases later"
should be included in trend analyses because they "are of such du53
bious quality," though he ultimately decided to include them.
Powell's study found that both the level of manufacturing activity
and the costs of particulate control were significantly related to
changes in levels of particulates and that "regulatory controls
dampened the peak ozone concentrations," though increased vehicular traffic had the opposite effect. 54 Here are Powell's "Conclusions" in their entirety:
Overall, the results of this analysis suggest that mandated
pollution control investments have often had a significant effect in reducing maximum air pollutant concentrations. The
effects of regulatory controls, however, generally have been
overshadowed by the effects of economic changes, weather,
and other factors. Also, the failure of local factors (e.g., the
level of local manufacturing activity and local pollution control investments) to account for a majority of the variation in
local air quality underscores the importance of regional or naand non-regulatory) in detertional factors (both regulatory
55
mining local air quality.
In other words, mandated pollution control investments significantly reduce peak pollutant concentrations, though because
other factors (like weather and plant closings) can lead to large
variations at the local level, regional or national factors also are
important to consider. If anything, these conclusions support the
notion that national environmental regulation works. Lomborg's
tortured effort to convert them into a brief for the irrelevance of
environmental law only serves to heighten one's doubts concerning his objectivity.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 9.
53 Id. at 8.
54 Id. at 10, 12, 13.
55 Id. at 15.
51

52
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Contrast Lomborg's attack on environmental law with Gregg
Easterbrook's more balanced view. Easterbrook writes that:
Most environmental initiatives of the past seemed expensive
and questionable at the time, and today every one of them
appears a bargain in retrospect. Looking back on the present
a few decades hence, society will consider every environmental program running now to have been a bargain, and
wish more programs had been started sooner.56
Unfortunately, Lomborg does not explore what regulAtions
have been most successful and should be strengthened. While he
begrudgingly acknowledges that some environmental regulations
have been beneficial, Lomborg simply cannot make a plausible
case that environmental conditions would have improved as much
without environmental regulation or with less public support for it.
Because he fails to explore in any detail the causes of environmental progress, Lomborg's work has little or no value for developing improved public policies.
Particularly infuriating to those who have fought hard to improve environmental law is that some of the examples of environmental progress Lomborg cites occurred only due to regulatory
initiatives they supported. The phase out of lead in gasoline is an
excellent example. It occurred only after a decade and a half of
battles fought by environmentalists and government officials
against the lead industry. The key victory in the first round of battles was a 5-4 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, sitting en banc, reversing a decision striking down EPA's
initial lead limits as based on data that were "speculative and inconclusive., 57 The court's powerful endorsement of precautionary
regulation was a significant turning point in the development of
environmental law. Six years later, environmentalists successfully
resisted the Reagan administration's efforts to repeal limits on lead
in gasoline, and the EPA later began a phase out of lead additives,
eventually culminating in a total prohibition imposed by Congress
that took effect in 1996.58 This is widely viewed as one of the
great success stories for environmental policy.
Lomborg cites the dramatic reductions in lead pollution as
part of the environmental progress he tries to spin into a vehicle to
56

EASTERBROOK, supra note 4, at 210.

57 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
58 PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 29, at 403; Ellen K. Silbergeld & Robert V. Percival, The
Organometals: Impact of Accidental Exposure and Experimental Data on Regulatory Policies,
in NEUROTOXICANTS AND NEUROBIOLOGICAL FUNCTION 327, 340-46 (Hugh A. Tilson & Shel-

don B. Sparber, eds. 1987).
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discredit the environmental movement. The implication of his
work is that the public should no longer listen to environmental
advocates because things have gotten better. Yet as the history of
lead regulation demonstrates, industries can successfully delay
regulatory initiatives for considerable periods of time, despite
strong public support for environmental protection. This certainly
does not support Lomborg's claim that public overreaction to fearmongering by environmental groups has wasted society's resources.
IV. HAS ENVIRONMENTAL FEAR-MONGERING SKEWED
REGULATORY PRIORITIES?

Even if one were to accept for the sake of argument Lomborg's notion that the public sometimes places too much faith in
environmentalists whose fears prove to be exaggerated, Lomborg
is wholly unable to make a convincing case that this has distorted
priorities and wasted society's resources. Lomborg fails to consider how difficult it is to translate public support into effective
regulatory measures in the face of determined opposition from industry. As the experience with regulation of gasoline lead additives demonstrates, it took decades of effort to remove this serious
threat to public health that initially was regulated only because a
court, by the narrowest of margins, endorsed precautionary regulation.
Lomborg's efforts to make a case that exaggerated public
concern has caused harm focuses primarily on regulation of toxic
substances. Here he sounds reminiscent of those who Easterbrook
dubs the "unviros" because they unthinkingly repeat discredited
mantras about regulatory excesses. 59 For example, Lomborg implies that pesticide regulation is crazy because any pesticide shown
to cause cancer must be banned without consideration of "how
much damage they actually do and how much it would cost to
59 While Gregg Easterbrook is also enthusiastic about the environmental progress Lomborg trumpets and scornful of doom and gloom forecasts from environmentalists, his views
concerning regulation of toxic substances stand in sharp contrast to Lomborg's. Easterbrook
writes:
On the right-wing talk-show circuit, two false ideas have arisen in recent years about the risks posed by synthetic compounds. One holds that
dioxin, DDT, and the rest are actually harmless. This view is nonsense.
The second is that panic about chemicals indicates an antiscientific hysteria at work in the public at large. Far from it: Public fear of chemicals
is an entirely rational reaction.
EASTERBROOK, supra note 4, at 230. Easterbrook concludes that: "Toxics cannot possibly be
good for us or the ecology. That's all we really need to know to justify a goal of zero toxic
discharge." Id. at 255-56.
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avoid their use." 60 This is simply untrue, a false caricature of our
regulatory system. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, which governs regulation of pesticides has always employed an explicit risk-benefit balancing standard. Only pesticides
that cause "unreasonable adverse effects" can be banned 6' and only
after "the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits
of the use of any pesticide" are considered.6 2
The centerpiece of Lomborg's concluding chapter is the bynow-notorious study by Tammy Tengs and John Graham for the
Harvard Center for Risk Analysis charging that misplaced regulatory priorities result in "statistical murder" because a different set
of priorities could save 60,000 lives at no additional CoSt. 63 Repeating the ridiculous "statistical murder" metaphor, Lomborg improperly jumps to the conclusion that the study shows we are wasting resources on environmental programs to protect the public
64
from exposure to toxics.
As Lisa Heinzerling has shown, 65 there are several fundamental problems with this claim. Most of the initiatives included in
the Tengs and Graham study involved health care measures and
not environmental initiatives, and Tengs and Graham mistakenly
assumed that all the environmental initiatives included in their
study were implemented when in fact many were never even proposed, much less implemented.66 As Heinzerling notes, only 11 of
90 environmental initiatives included in the study that produced
the 60,000 lives saved estimate were ever implemented. The most
expensive initiatives were never adopted in large part because of
concern over their cost. Thus, rather than proving that excessive
public concern for the environment has produced wasteful regulatory priorities, as Lomborg wants to believe, the study tends to
suggest just the opposite. Heinzerling notes that Tengs and Graham considered prevention of cancer to be the only benefit of the
environmental programs they examined,6 7 and that 50 of the 90
environmental initiatives in the study involved a version of section
112 of the Clean Air Act that no longer exists, and 31 were part of
60

LOMBORG, supra note 5, at 9-10.

7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (2000).
7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2000).
Tammy 0. Tends et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their CostEffectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 369 (1995).
64 LOMBORG, supra note 5, at 342.
65 Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory Movement,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 648, 650-61 (2002); Lisa Heinzerling, Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Misuse in the Debate Over Regulatory Reform, 13 RISK 151 (2002).
66 Heinzerling, supra note 65, at 156-59.
67 Id. at 163.
61
62
63
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the EPA's ban on asbestos,68 which was invalidated by the Fifth
Circuit. 69 Thus, the Tengs and Graham analysis does not constitute a representative assessment of the state of environmental priorities, though Lomborg seems eager to embrace it as such.
Lomborg concludes with an attack on the precautionary principle, and argues that it will guarantee that we make regulatory
decisions that will leave us worse off.70 But the precautionary
principle actually tells us nothing about how precautionary to be,
but rather only that uncertainty should not automatically block
71
cost-effective measures to prevent serious or irreversible harm.
The experience with regulation of gasoline lead additives demonstrates the wisdom of this common sense notion.
Lomborg generally does not emphasize how important scientific uncertainty is as a factor that complicates forecasts of environmental impacts and the formulation of environmental
policymaking. He confidently proclaims that he is the bearer of
"the truth" who has exposed the lies of the doom and gloom
environmentalists despite the enormous uncertainties that plague
the statistics, data, and models used to assess environmental
conditions. 72 What is particularly telling about Lomborg's
discussion of the health effects of small particulates is that it
involves a problem discovered only recently as a result of
Even if
substantial improvements in epidemiological data.
existing trends are promising, it seems likely that as scientific
understanding improves we will discover new problems that
society previously was not aware of. Environmental law and
precautionary regulation are substantially reducing the enormous
health damage caused by small particulates, though only after a
mammoth legal battle that culminated in a decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court rejecting industry claims that the Clean Air Act is
unconstitutional.73 This is where the real environmental battles are

61 Id. at 161.
69 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
70 LOMBORG, supra note 5, at 350.
71 See Principle 15 of the Declaration of Principles from the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development reproduced in PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 29, at 1105 ("In
order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied to states
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation.").
72 One reviewer of Lomborg noted that "[alnyone claiming to know the 'truth' is grossly
overconfident and underinformed." Peter H. Gleick, Where's Waldo: A Review of the Skeptical
Environmentalist, Union of ConcernedScientists, at 7, at http://www.ucsusa.org/publication.
cfm?publicationlD=393 (Nov. 6, 2002).
73 Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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being fought today, not over whether Paul Ehrlich's forecasts from
decades past have proved accurate.
CONCLUSION: THE VALUE OF LOMBORG'S WORK

Lomborg concludes by expressing the hope that his book will
"lead to an appreciable change in attitude to environmental problems. 74 But the attitude that Lomborg wants us to adopt is one of
greater skepticism to what environmental advocates say and less
support for environmental protection measures. While Lomborg
claims that society has suffered because of unreasonable public
concern generated by fear-mongering environmentalists, the principal evidence Lomborg presents is that we have made so much
environmental progress in the past. However, it simply does not
logically follow from this progress that society has wasted too
many resources on environmental protection. While Lomborg
floats the notion that environmental law has been superfluous to
environmental progress, the studies he cites simply do not support
his claim. Thus, even if Lomborg were correct in his optimistic
assessment of environmental trends, the "spin" he tries to derive
from them is in precisely the wrong direction.
While Lomborg's spin-doctoring undermines an otherwise
impressive effort to assess the state of the planet, his work may
have some lasting benefits. It is undoubtedly useful to be reminded that enormous environmental progress already has been
made, though it should not be "spun" as evidence that environmentalists are liars who should be distrusted (which seems a bit like
saying that if crime rates decline the police are fear-mongers for
constantly reminding us to be vigilant). Rather than fighting old
wars between enviros and unviros, a more reasonable approach
would acknowledge that both advocates for industry and the environment occasionally get things wrong and that perhaps we all
would do well to be a bit more humble about predicting the future
in the face of enormous uncertainties.
More scrutiny of environmental success stories also would be
useful to help improve our already demonstrated ability to use law
to promote collective action to respond successfully to environmental problems, old and new. The more we do so, the more optimistic we may become about our ability to protect the health of
the planet for future generations. Indeed, there already are signs
that environmentalists may be moving in this direction. The lead
story in the most recent issue of the Earth Island Journal, cap74 LOMBORG,

supra note 5, at 351 (emphasis omitted).
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tioned "What's Right with Nature & Wrong with Doomsaying,"
decries environmental cynicism and argues that rather than foster"need to convey
ing "resignation and despair," environmentalists
75
that which is capable of inspiring hope.
Unfortunately, despite the enormous attention devoted to it,
Lomborg's work has not spawned a serious debate over what can
be learned from decades of experience with environmental regulation or how policy can be improved in the future. Lomborg, his
champions, and many of his critics have been too obsessed with
scoring points against one another. Thus, Lomborg and his supporters focus on statements that do not represent the views of the
mainstream environmental movement today while Lomborg's critics respond largely to his harsh, anti-environmentalist spin that
they view as questioning their ethics.
Sadly, the true value of Lomborg's work may lie in what the
reactions to it reveal about the sorry state of contemporary environmental politics. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, public
concern for the environment led Congress to enact a remarkable
set of environmental laws with overwhelming, bipartisan support.
These laws helped produce considerable progress on the environmental front, contributing to many of the positive trends Lomborg
emhasizes. While the environment is no longer a bipartisan issue,
those who could profit from relaxing environmental regulations
have learned that it is a losing strategy to propose publicly to
weaken environmental protections. As a result, politically savvy
opponents of regulation now concentrate on making stealth efforts
to roll back protections by seeking to disguise them as reforms to
improve environmental programs.
How much easier it would be if no one listened to environmentalists. Thus, it is no wonder that so many unviros have embraced Lomborg's message so enthusiastically, for that message at
its most basic is simply a counsel to discount whatever environmentalists say and to devote less effort to protecting the environment. This is well illustrated by Judge Alex Kozinski's review of
Lomborg's work.7 6 Kozinski declares it to be "an indispensable
resource to anyone seriously interested in the environment, and in
helping to formulate rational responses to the challenges presented
by industrialized society. 7 7

75 Paul Rogat Loeb, What's Wrong With Cynicism, 17 EARTH ISLAND J. 32, 34 (Autumn
2002).
76 Alex Kozinski, Gore Wars, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1742 (2002).
77 Id. at 1746.
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Enthusiastically embracing Lomborg's analysis,78 Kozinski
uses it as a platform for his own, even harsher condemnation of the
environmental movement. He dismisses public support for environmental protection as the product of the mendacity of environmentalists ("it is because environmental activists often lie, in big
ways and small") and proclaims that the true cost of joining the
rest of the world in the Kyoto Protocol's modest effort to control
greenhouse gas emissions would be "the end of industrial society.",79 While acknowledging that some of the Lomborg's targets
no longer espouse the ancient views Lomborg attacks (e.g, Holdren "cheerfully admits that we are not running out of natural resources and doubts that few, if any, environmentalists now believe
that we are"), Kozinski nevertheless demands that they be "called
to account" for "bully[ing] us into making bad choices based on
unsubstantiated predictions of doom., 80 Oddly, Kozinski does not
recommend a similar accounting for the frequently false cries of
doom by regulatory targets who maintained that phasing lead out
of gasoline would cause major gasoline shortages, that the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments could precipitate economic collapse,
or that removing Alar from the food supply would set a precedent
that would cause major food shortages. The only bad choices that
Kozinski discusses are local recycling programs and federal fuel
economy standards - hardly a significant indictment of federal environmental law. 81 He then falsely portrays environmentalists as
calling for the wholesale elimination of pesticides and concludes
with a ringing endorsement of the discredited Tengs/Graham table
discussed above.82
Perhaps what is most telling about Judge Kozinski's analysis
is his concluding proclamation that if environmentalists "persist in
telling us we're too dumb, too greedy or too dysfunctional to make
our own rational choices, then they deserve no place at the discussion table.",83 Excuse me? Is he suggesting that environmentalists
be excluded from public debate on environmental issues in order to
ensure that environmental policy is the product of democratic
choice? Wouldn't it be great for those who would profit from relaxing environmental standards if they no longer had to deal with
78

yes.").

Id. at 1750 ("Does his analysis make sense? Is it adequately documented? In a word,

Id. at 1763, 1756.
I0
Id. at 1767.
S The recycling programs are not a product of federal law and Kozinski's criticism of the
long dormant CAFt standards, which the Bush administration recently proposed to increase, is
essentially a call for more stringent safety standards to counter efforts to evade them.
82 Id. at 1766-67.
8.1 Id. at 1767.
79
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environmental concerns either because the public, or unelected
judges with lifetime tenure like Judge Kozinski, no longer listened
to them? If Lomborg's views can be used to promote such extreme notions, no wonder they have greeted with such enthusiasm
by opponents of environmental protection. Konzinski also condemns environmentalists as "immoral", "highly undemocratic and unforgivably condescending." 84
What is most troubling about the judge's embrace of Lomborg's arguments as an excuse for tuning out environmental concerns is that far too many important environmental policy choices
are now being made in the courts instead of Congress or the EPA.
During the last two years, the federal judiciary has been the focus
of efforts by activists to gut the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water
Act, the Endangered Species Act, and state land use regulations.
While most courts have rejected these efforts, Judge Kozinski's
review suggests that Lomborg's work may be embraced by some
to justify judicial efforts to rewrite the environmental laws to
benefit opponents of regulation, even though nothing in Lomborg's analysis supports such a result. A more intelligent response
to Lomborg's work would be to view it as a beacon of hope that
helps illuminate the progress that environmental policies have produced and that stimulates renewed efforts to learn how to make
those policies even more effective in the future. But as the hysterical reaction to Lomborg's tendentious work demonstrates, that
is probably too much to ask given the current sorry state of environmental politics.

84 Kozinski's charge that environmentalists are arrogant is particularly interesting since it
comes from someone who permitted the opening footnote next to his name to read: "Our readers
are far too savvy to need explaining who Judge Kozinski is." Id. at 1742 nal.

MR. LOMBORG AND THE COMMON

LAW
Bruce Yandlet
INTRODUCTION

While it is still too early to say, it is entirely possible that the
publication of Bjorn Lomborg's book, The Skeptical Environmen-

talist,1 will someday be viewed as a watershed event that contributed mightily to the end of the rise of centralized command-andcontrol of environmental use and the resurgence of decentralized
management of environmental use under a rule of law. Although
2
this is not the first documentation of environmental improvement,
his is clearly the most complete. As the work of an apostate, one
converted from pessimism to optimism, it is even more persuasive
and therefore the most powerful. Add to this timing, a time when
the limits of command-and-control regulation are being reached,
and recognition of the virtues of decentralization and market incentives are moving to fore, and Lomborg's book becomes a veritable tour de force.3
In an exchange following a discussion of his work at Washington's Competitive Enterprise Institute, Lomborg explained how
an intellectual encounter with the work of the late Julian Simon
inspired the book. Lomborg wanted to see if it was possible that
Simon's positive description of the state of the world could possibly be accurate. The book is the result.
Senior Associate, PERC, and Profoessor of Economics Emeritus, Clemson University.
BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE
OF THE WORLD (Cambridge University Press 2001) (1998).
2 See, e.g., EARTH REPORT 2000: REVISITING THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET (Ron
Bailey ed. 2000); STEVEN HAYWARD & JULIE MAJERES, PACIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE'S INed. 2002), available at
DEX OF LEADING ENVIRONMENTAL- INDICATORS (7th

(last
http://www.pacificresearch.org/pub/sab/enviro/ei2002-states/pri-enviro-index-2002.pdf
visited Nov. 18, 2002).
3 The fact that Lomborg's book has created a firestorm of criticism and controversy
within environmental circles, and that the Danish Committees on Scientific Dishonesty on January 7, 2003 ruled his book to be "systematically one-sided" adds to the growing interest in learning what Lomborg has to say. Major elements of this debate are reported on Lomborg's website, www.lomborg.com (last visited Jan. 9, 2003).
4 Lomborg discusses his encounter with Julian Simon's ideas and the reactions to his
book, both positive and negative, in an interview at Competitive Enterprise Institute. See Q&A
with Bjorn Lomborg: Author of the Skeptical Environmentalist, CEI UPDATE, Dec. 2001, at 8-9.
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But while the book is an empirical encyclopedia on world environmental quality, it also delivers something of a statement
about people and what they did and can do to make things better.
Near the end of the book, speaking to the question of why things
have gone so well, Lomborg tells us that the positive outcome for
the environment did not derive from massive world sessions with
worry beads:
Things have gone so well because we have worked hard to
improve our situation. In some circumstances this has happened almost automatically, as in the continued growth of
economic wealth. We have become richer and richer primarily because of our fundamental organization in a market
economy and not because we have worried. 5
Lomborg recognizes that regulation has made things better in
some cases, but it was because of priorities, not the regulation per
se, that things improved. One might paraphrase by saying it was
definition and enforcement of property rights, regulatory 6 and private, that contributed to meaningful environmental improvement.
His story is about people living in diverse countries building diverse institutions to get beyond the prospect of a tragedy of the
commons. Indeed, the prospect of the tragedy seems to have become a prelude to plenty.
Is there a link between Lomborg's optimistic environmental
assessment and common law? I feel strongly that there is, but the
linkage is obviously not direct in the sense that he discusses the
importance of a rule of law. The linkage I see is about decentralized versus centralized institutions for defining and protecting
property rights and what that may mean for wealth creation. This
translates into choices as between common and statute law for
dealing with environmental problems, the legal framework, if you
will, within which Lomborg's assessment is made.
In this Article, I will first lay a foundation by discussing
stages and elements of the environmental saga that began to
Lomborg's position is captured in the name ascribed to his book, The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World. He indicates that he deliberately chose a title to
serve as counterpoint to another best seller, The State of the World, a widely read annual publication of Worldwatch Institute. As he takes the reader through reams of charts and data, Lomborg debunks a number of pessimistic assertions found in the Worldwatch publication.
5 LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 351.
6 Commentators have discussed regulatory property rights. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677
(1999). Wiener fully develops the notion of regulatory property rights and differentiates this
from private property rights. An example of regulatory property rights is seen in discharge
permits issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Without the permit, which is not
transferable but nonetheless valuable, a plant cannot discharge effluent into a river or stream.
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emerge in the United States and the developed world in the 1960s.
This was the saga that began with environmental plenty, experienced a number of serious tragedies that then helped form an emotional, if not a scientific, basis for ushering in large bodies of statute law. In some cases, the new statute law dismissed common
law protection. 7 In every instance, the dominant statute law imposed new constraints on environmental use. Bad news and
environmental pessimism, was important in all of this. A
continuing flow of bad news about the environment provided a
basis for continued growth of centralized environmental control.
The stages of environmental activity I describe will then be
linked to certain elements of Environmental Kuznets Curves
(EKCs), 8 those statistical artifacts that describe relationships between income and environmental quality. Then, the more interesting parts of the EKCs will be related to property rights institutions
and the protections provided by common law. This decidedly
richer-is-cleaner story will make the final connection between Mr.
Lomborg and the Common Law.
I.

THE STAGES OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL SAGA

In 1977, I began an outline of what I called the stages of the
environmental saga.9 Now, after almost 30 years to think about
the outline, I have some additional ideas. Thinking in terms of
stages, it seems that the story about environmental institution
building began as the first stage was ending. I call the first stage
Manna from Heaven. The expression is an attempt to capture the
notion of environmental plenty, that happy time when the initial
natural endowment of water and air quality, to take two examples,
was ample enough either fully to assimilate wastes or to provide
new low-cost locations when the older sites have been depleted of
the environmental assets. Manna from Heaven begins with plenty
and extends to the point where custom, tradition, and decentralized
private law and statutes slowly emerge as ways to manage conflicts over environmental use.

7 See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding common law in
interstate disputes was replaced by statute law protections). For discussion of similar Canadian
experience, see ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEFENSE OF NATURE (1995).
8 For an explanation and background on EKCs, see BRUCE YANDLE ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE: A PRIMER (Political Economy Research Center, PERC Research

Studies No. 02-1, 2002), available at http://www.perc.org/pdf/rs02_l.pdf

[hereinafter ENVI-

RONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVES].

9 For a discussion of the "environmental saga," see HUGH H. MACAULAY & BRUCE
YANDLE, ENVIRONMENTAL USE AND THE MARKET (1977).
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I term the second stage Common Law & Community Environmentalism. 10 During this period of evolving order, land rights
emerge, along with rules of law for contracting land use and transfers.' Common law seems to have entered the property rights lexicon as a part of feudal land law. In time, the same common law
expands to provide rules that protect the owners of riparian land
who might be damaged by upstream dischargers of waste. Eventually, the common law extends to protect holders of land rights
from nuisance or trespass formed by air pollution, always tending
to do so where environmental scarcity is more severe.
Stage two is characterized by a relatively smooth evolutionary
process that yields institutions tending to encourage the formation
and preservation of wealth, including environmental protection.
Common law rules emerge as environmental scarcity threatens the
wealth of holders of land and other rights. Environmental assets
become subject to contracts, and environmental rights become recognizable components of the bundle of sticks that define property.
Common Law & Community Environmentalism ends when crises
occur that seemingly cannot be handled by the property rights institutions available at the time. In some cases, this is because of
the need for collective as opposed to private action. In other cases,
the transition to centralized political decision making is made because doing so is politically profitable. Stage three is called the
period of Holy Water.
Holy Water does not come simultaneously for all environmental assets and uses. The transition may come first for air quality in some locations, for water quality in others, for land-based
assets in still other locations. For example, water quality in the
Ruhr broke across the divide at the end of the 1 9 th century, following a devastating typhoid outbreak. 12 A similar crossing occurred
for the Ohio River in the 1940s, after serious problems with gastroenteritis.13 Air quality, always troublesome in Los Angeles due
to geological and atmospheric features, made the shift in Califor-

"I For a discussion of common law environmentalism, see Roger E. Meiners & Bruce
Yandle, Common Law Environmentalism, 94 PUB. CHOICE 49 (1998).
11 For a discussion on some of these issues, see Bruce Yandle, Escaping Environmental
Feudalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 517 (1992); Bruce Yandle, Organic Constitutions and
the Common Law, 2 CONST. POL. ECON. 225 (1991).
12 BRUCE YADDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 34
(1997).
13 ROBERT CLEARLY, THE ORSANCO STORY (1967).
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nia in the 1950s when smog first appeared. 14 And toxic chemical
use moved to stage three following the Bophal tragedy. 15
The selection of the name for stage three is not a casual
choice. Holy Water has mysterious powers to harm human populations. Because of the unknown harms that can be done to and by
the environment, it is almost, if not fully, deserving of worship. 6
Where stage two was characterized by evolving environmental use
and rights for use, stage three is about restrictions, fear of unknown harms, stepping back and avoiding use, cost to those who
make forbidden use, and benefits to the new priestly cast that
guards the environment. Political voices in stage three call upon
government to do what governments are formed to do - to provide
for the public welfare by protecting human communities from environmental harms.
The statutes that emerge with Holy Water are built on bad
news. Fear, not facts, becomes the driving force. For example, the
1980 Global 2000 Report to the Presidentoffers this gloomy outlook:
If the present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be
more crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and
more vulnerable to disruption than the world we live in now.
Serious stresses involving population, resources, and environment are clearly visible ahead. Despite greater material
output, the world's people will be poorer in many ways than
they are today.17
With such gloom in official forecasts, it is no wonder that water pollution control legislation calls for the elimination of all human discharge to rivers and streams,' 8 that parts of air quality con14 See Paul R. Portney, Air Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 77, 78 (Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2000).
15 Mariela Mercedes & Nino Restrepo, Evaluationof Toxic Release Inventory Data Using

Risk Assessment Techniques, in THE MARKET MEETS THE ENVIRONMENT 85, 85 (Bruce Yandle
ed., 1999).
16 Jason Annan, Is Environmentalisma New State Religion?, in THE MARKET MEETS THE
ENVIRONMENT supra note 15, at 295 (arguing that "[tioday's modem environmental movement
possesses many of the traits of organized religion); Robert H. Nelson, Bruce Babbitt, Pipeline to
the Almighty, WKLY STANDARD, June 24, 1996, at 17 (discussing Bruce Babbitt, then Secretary
of the Interior, who believes that he is carrying out God's instructions through his environmental
policies); Robert H. Nelson, Does "Existence Value" Exist?, INDEP. REV., Spring 1997, at 499,
518 (arguing that the "existence of value amounts to a Trojan horse. Seeming for a time to
sustain the social role of economics, in the long run it can only help undermine it."). But see
Brian Kropp, Environmental Organizations:What Makes them Tick?, in THE MARKET MEETS
THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 15, at 259-93 (showing that membership in environmental organizations seems to be a substitute for membership in traditional religious organizations).
17 GERALD 0. BARNEY, GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT1 (1980).
18 A. Myrick Freeman III, Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRON-

MENTAL PROTECTION 169, 174 (Paul M. Portney ed., 2000).
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trol are based on the prevention of significant deterioration,19
which means the strictest possible technical standards, and that
toxic chemical control is predicated on the community's right to
know about any possible pending disaster. To make certain there
is a margin of safety, hazardous waste elimination is based on
cleanup standards that are the same as for drinking water. Stage
20
three carries with it a distinct flavor of environmental Calvinism.
It is Mr. Lomborg's period of worry.
During Holy Water stage, two property rights institutions are
pushed to one side and replaced by central authorities with command-and-control regulation. Statutes become the guardians of
nature's cathedral. Custom, tradition, and common law are not
viewed as severe or reliable enough. As stage three matures, the
real cost of implementing and living with a multitude of environmental regulations begins to be recognized. Along with cost recognition comes the beginning of understanding how ecological
systems work and what happens when various kinds of interventions occur. Little by little, fear of environmental use is replaced
with newly gained facts about how to manage environmental use.
As costs become visible, incentives for cost-effective management
gain some appreciation. Ultimately, recognition that commandand-control may not be necessary, or even desirable, for addressing every environmental concern begins to accompany calls for
reform, even a recapture of stage two institutions. This identifies
the early boundary of stage four, Economic Environment.
When environmental resources and consequences of their use
are better understood, when rapidly increasing costs are associated
with efforts to gain even trivial amounts of improvement by way
of technology-based standards, when local knowledge and incentives to improve are seen as being potentially superior to centralized knowledge and incentives, and when the merits of flexibility
and tailored institutions as opposed to one-suit-fits-all solutions
become part of the legitimate discourse, then Economic Environment has emerged. Elements of stage four thinking show up at
different times and places for the management of different environmental assets. For example, property rights and crude permit
trading for some air pollutants emerged in California's South
Coast in the late 1970s. 21 Permit trading then became the center19 For discussion of air quality policy, see Portney, supra note 14, at 85.
20 See Robert H. Nelson, Environmental Calvinism: The Judeo-Christian Roots of Eco-

theology, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY 233 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle
eds., 1993) (comparing modem environmentalism to the theology of Martin Luther, John Calvin, and the Protestant Refirmation).
21 See Bruce Yandle, The Emerging Market in Air Emissions, REGULATION, July/Aug.
1978, at 21 (explaining that California's South Coast Air Quality Control Region was the loca-
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piece for controlling sulfur dioxide emissions throughout the Eastern United States in 1990.22 Contracting to reduce the cost of water pollution control entered the scene in North Carolina in the
early 1990s, 23 this after it was found that command-and-control
regulation simply would not solve serious fish kill problems. 24 A
resurgence of common law protection of environmental rights became apparent in hazardous waste litigation in the 1990s. 25 And an
announced intention to use markets and trading as a new foundation for U.S. water pollution control was made in 2002.26 Clearly,
we have entered the age of Economic Environment, which means
that at the margin, environmental policy will show greater tendency to be decentralized, to recognize opportunity cost and the
use of incentives, and to build on market forces as opposed to
seeking to muffle those forces.
This story about the modern environmental saga and its stages
implies that human populations regularly seek practical rules for
maintaining and improving life, that there is a wealth-conserving
force always at work, and that when events push human communities off the wealth-producing property rights path and new hardedged command-and-control institutions emerge, counter forces
will be triggered to pull communities back on path. Those forces
will be most effective in societies that respect constitutional principles that include private property protection under a rule of law.
Man, the institution builder, is always at work modifying wealthcreating and preserving institutions. But there is still more to the
story about institutions, preserving wealth, and the use of envition where the first experiments with air pollution offsets occurred, later to become EPA policy.
The offset mechaihism allowed expansion of air polluting firms if the firm could obtain more
than equal offsets from existing polluters for the same emissions to be released.).
22 Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A
New Erafrom an Old Idea?, 18 EcOLOGY L.Q. 1, 22 (1991).
21 See generally David W. Riggs, Market Incentives for Water Quality, in THE MARKET
MEETS THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 15, at 167 (discussing the factors leading to, and the
results of, the information of a water quality market to combat pollution in the Tar-Pamlico
watershed).
24 Id.
2 See Karol Boudreaux & Bruce Yandle, Public Bads and Public Nuisance: Common
Law Remedies for Environmental Decline (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
For a discussion about this and resurgence generally, see also Denise Antolini, Modernizing
Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 Ecology L.Q. 755 (2001)
(discussing traditional public nuisance law and possible approaches to modernizing the law in
light of recent debates regarding appropriate remedies for environmental harms); Tom Kuhnle,
The Rebirth of Common Law Actions for Addressing Hazardous Waste Contamination, 15
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 187 (1996) (discussing the history of common law contamination actions and
the affects of hazardous waste regulations on such actions).
26 See generally Bruce Yandle & Brian Mannix, Public Interest Comment on the Environmental Protection Agency's Proposed Water Quality Trading Policy, Mercatus Center, at
http://www.mercatus.org/waterquality.pdf (June 26, 2002) (discussing E.P.A. proposal
67FR3409 and recommendations regarding future permit trading policies and regulations).
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ronmental assets. For fundamental institutional change to enter the
action agenda, calm and rational thought must have replaced fear,
pessimism, and religious sentiments about environmental use.
Hard and convincing data describing environmental progress must
surface. The Skeptical Environmentalistmay become as much of a
tour de force for this period as Silent Spring27 may have been for
the beginning of Holy Water.

II.

TRAVELING THE EKC IN STAGES

The stages of the environmental saga can be interpreted in
terms of an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC).28 First reported
in 199129 and now standard fare in environmental economics, the
EKC shows a mapping of income, such as per capita GDP, to some
specific measure of environmental quality, such as the concentration of sulfur dioxide in ambient air in particular locations. In its
general form, the EKC takes on an inverted-U shape. The conventional relationship shows three zones. In the first, the environment
is deteriorating as income rises from very low levels. This rising
leg of the inverted U corresponds to the final stages of Manna
from Heaven, that stage where use of the environment, within the
limits of custom, tradition, and private law, has allowed part of the
environmental endowment to be consumed. This is the period of
institutional construction for Common Law & Community Environmentalism. Following the inverted U, one can picture the approaching peak, a zone that corresponds to the end of rightprotected environmental use and the beginning of conservation and
recovery. The peak results from a combination of Common Law &
Community Environmentalism and Holy Water. It is here that statute law and federal regulation largely displace common law and
community control. Then, as the EKC progresses, the environment gets cleaner, always in association with rising income, thus
corresponding to Lomborg point that environmental progress has
been made "almost automatically, as in the continued growth of
economic wealth., 30 The downward-sloping leg of the inverted U
can be related to the stage of Economic Enviornment.
EKCs reflecting the inverted U shape have now been estimated for a diverse collection of measurements of environmental
27 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
28 For a recent discussion of the concept and survey of the EKC literature, see ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE, supra note 8.
29 GENE M. GROSSMAN & ALAN B. KRUEGER, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF A NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.

3914, 1991), available at http://www.nber.org.
30 LOMBORG, supra note 1, 351.
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quality for air, water, and forestry. 3' However, it must be emphasized that some dimensions of environmental quality, that some
argue should be an important human concern, do not follow the
EKC model. Carbon emissions, for example, show an upwardsloping linear relationship with income for as far as data allow one
to observe. 32 Higher income means more carbon emissions, no
matter how the income is measured. If there is a turning point for
carbon, that point has not as yet been reached. This suggests that
there has been no Holy Water event for carbon emissions. Quite
possibly, the effects of the Kyoto Protocol and debates about climate change have not as yet entered the data.
There is a system of property rights for every nation that
might be included in an EKC estimate. However, more often than
not, the different property rights institutions are not accounted for
when estimates are made. That being so, it is not possible to say
what happens when communities impose stricter enforcement of
contracts, require that contracts be enforced, have constitutional
protections that limit government confiscation of property. Qin
made estimates of dimensions of air and water quality for a balanced panel of countries from developing to developed, controlling
for property rights protection. 33 His property rights variables are
adjusted for risk of property confiscation by government and the
degree to which contracts are enforced in courts of law. The results show environmental improvement came early for countries
with stronger property rights enforcement. The results also show
that deterioration was not as severe where property rights were
stronger. With EKC learning telling us that richer is cleaner and
that property rights enforcement matters, it is not a long leap to
suggest that common law enforcement of contracts and protection
of environmental rights helps to avoid the worst of the tragedies
and brings environmental improvement sooner.
Indur Goklany has done fundamental work on human wellbeing around the world, and his findings are consistent with those
found in the EKC literature.34 He has also researched extensively
the condition of U.S. air quality, going back as far as monitoring
data allow. 35 His conclusions on air pollution control generally
31 ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVES, supra note 8, at 13-16.

32 Xiang Dong Qin, Economic Development and Environmental Quality - A Look at the
Environmental Kuznets Curve (1998) (unpublished dissertation, Clemson University) (on file
with Clemson University Library).
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., INDUR M. GOKLANY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE STATE OF HUMANITY

(Political Economy Research Center, PERC Policy Series No. PS-21, 2001), available at
http://www.perc.org/pdf/ps2 l.pdf.
35 See INDUR M. GOKLANY, CLEARING THE AIR (1999) [hereinafter CLEARING THE AIR];
Indur M. Goklany, EmpiricalEvidence Regarding the Role of Nationalizationin Improving U.S.
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parallel Lomborg's: air quality has improved significantly in recent decades.3 6 But Goklany does more than examine trends. He
looks for patterns in the data that can be interpreted in human behavior terms.37 On the basis of early actions taken to reduce air
pollution - e.g., city ordinances, common law actions - Goklany
identifies a "period of perception" for each pollutant he examined.38 At first blush one might think that Goklany's time of recognition corresponds to the approaching peak of the EKC and the
Holy Water stage. However, this conclusion is just opposite to the
point he makes in his work. Indeed, Goklany argues that meaningful action was being taken to control air pollution well before the
federal government became involved with statute writing, and he
illustrates his point in terms of that portion of an EKC that occurs
well before the peak. 39 This suggests that the Holy Water period is
more about getting centralized political action underway than
about the sheer necessity of building institutions that protect environmental rights.
Goklany makes this key point at the conclusion of his report
on air pollution control:
One of the justifications for nationalization is that it
was necessary to improve the nation's air quality because
"states had failed to act" and they "could not be trusted to
adopt adequate environmental controls" because of interstate
competition for business; hence, "Congress imposed national
regulations to control pollution only after its efforts to prod
states to act had failed."
In fact .... the empirical data ... show there was remarkable progress in improving air quality prior to nationalization becoming effective. n

III. COMMAND AND CONTROL OR COMMON LAW
Goklany's conclusion underlines part of the political rhetoric
that reinforced the watershed political decision made in the late
1960s that shifted environmental protection policy from the states
Air Quality, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 27 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P.
Morriss eds., 2000) [hereinafter Empirical Evidence].
36 Empirical Evidence, supra note 35, at 48.
37 Id. at41-42.
38 Id. at 39-40.
19 Id. at 41-42.
40 Id. at 44 (citations omitted) (quoting John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under
the Clean AirAct, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1193 n.37 (1995) & Robert V. Percival, Environmental
Federalism:HistoricalRoots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1160 (1995)).
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to the federal government. That decision was about property
rights. It was a choice as between private property rights protected
by common law coupled with community and state action 4 1 and
regulatory property rights spawned and enforced by statute law.42
The choice made can be visualized as a fork in the policy road that
leads to various property rights institutions.4 3 Private property
rights and common law protection head in one direction; regulatory property rights and statutes go in the other direction. The
regulatory path was taken 30 years ago, and a huge amount of
regulatory concrete has been poured since then. The decision to
centralize truncated, or at least filtered the continued evolution of,
common law environmentalism. There is no way for us to know
how common law would have evolved in such an environment, but
the case law would have undoubtedly been enriched by 30 years
experience with pollution cases.
To suggest that common law protections will be more dominant in a more optimistic world, is to suggest that statute-based
regulation will wither away. But rather than expecting the sudden
appearance of the equivalence of jack hammers breaking up the
concrete and deregulating, we should rather expect to see some
erosion at the margin, some experimentation with market-based
regulation that calls for common law contracting, greater recognition of the relative merits of state and local experimentation and
control, 44 and taking the private property, common law, route for
newly identified problems.45
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS
Bjorn Lomborg's controversial good news treatise is fortified
by a substantial body of empirical work that supports the idea that
common law and community, no matter how discredited by Holy
Water evangelists, can provide protection for an important part of
41 For discussion of this point, see BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON LAW AND COMMON
SENSE
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1997).
42 Regulatory property rights

is a notion developed and discussed in Wiener, supra note 6.

43 Bruce Yandle, Legal Foundationsfor Evolving Property Rights Technologies,
in THE
TECHNOLOGY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, 9-10 (Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill eds., 2001).
44 For a recent report on action and possibilities, see Jonathan Adler, Let Fifty Flowers
Bloom: Transforming the States into Laboratoriesof Environmental Policy, 31 ENVTL L. REP.

11284 (2001), available at http://www.federalismproject.org/masterpages/environment/
flowers.pdf.
45 The prospect for this is seen in EPA's recent call for comments on the
market-based
approach for managing water quality. The proposal calls for watershed or river basin management based on contracting, which clearly means increased use of common law and a reduction
in the use of technology-based command-and-control regulation. See Notice of Public Information Collection(s), 67 Fed. Reg. 34,710 (May 15, 2002); Bruce Yandle & Brian Mannix, Public
Interest Comment on the Environmental Protection Agency's Proposed Water Quality Trading

Policy, Mercatus Center, at http://www.mercatus.org/waterquality.pdf (June 26, 2002).
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the environmental rights bundle. This is not the same thing as
predicting that 30 years of regulation will be neutralized and that
common law will assume its pre-1960s' status. Nor is this a prediction that Lomborg's treatise will lead to a mass epiphany where
thousands of regulatory rooters will suddenly exclaim that they
have seen the light and become common law environmentalism
advocates. This is not about a contest between two legal institutions. It is about designing the least-cost way to provide meaningful protection of environmental rights.
The prediction that comes with this review is that common
law logic that focuses on practical information about the circumstances of time, place, and harm, and even common law protection,
will enter the policy arena with greater force. The one-suit-fits-all
protection afforded by statutes and regulation may be necessary in
an age of Holy Water when many are led to believe that humanity
is engaged in a goal-line stand against environmental demons. But
the strictures of regulation are costly and often can be counterproductive. Perhaps, with the all-clear being heard, the more sophisticated common law can once again be an important component of
the panoply of institutions that delivery environmental protection.

